This paper addresses the security of optimistic fair exchange in a multi-user setting. While the security of public key encryption and public key signature schemes in a single-user setting guarantees the security in a multi-user setting, we show that the situation is different in the optimistic fair exchange. First, we show how to break, in the multi-user setting, an optimistic fair exchange scheme provably secure in the single-user setting. This example separates the security of optimistic fair exchange between the single-user setting and the multi-user setting. We then define the formal security model of optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting, which is the first complete security model of optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting. We prove the existence of a generic construction meeting our multi-user security based on one-way functions in the random oracle model and trapdoor one-way permutations in the standard model. Finally, we revisit two well-known methodologies of optimistic fair exchange, which are based on the verifiably encrypted signature and the sequential two-party multisignature, respectively. Our result shows that these paradigms remain valid in the multi-user setting.
Introduction
Multi-user Security. In the early stage of modern cryptography, public key cryptography was usually studied in the single-user setting and the security model assumed only one public key [23, 24] ; one receiver in the public key encryption and one signer in the public key signature. However, there are many users in the real world and the security in the single-user setting does not guard against the attacks by colluding dishonest users.
Even though the threats under multiple public keys were already pointed out in the 1980's (e.g., see [38, 26] ), the security in the multi-user setting was formally studied only recently [4, 21] . Fortunately, these researches show that the security of encryption schemes in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user setting [4] and the same result holds good for signature schemes 1 [21] . Therefore, we only have to deal with the single-user security and need not consider the multi-user security in the public key encryption and signature schemes. 2 1 A slightly different result is presented in [27] , where authors argue that the existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks in the single-user setting is not enough for the multi-user setting. However, their duplicate-signature key selection attack is not a flaw from the view of standard security notions and can be thwarted with ease. 2 Sometimes, separate security analysis in the multi-user setting shows tighter security reduction [4] , which is irrelevant to the subject of our paper.
model to the multi-user setting.
In this paper, we show that the single-user security of optimistic fair exchange does not guarantee multi-user security. We present a simple counterexample based on a signature scheme and a trapdoor permutation. We then define the multi-user security model of optimistic fair exchange, extending the model of [17] . While the single-user model of [17] is setup-driven, our multi-user model is setup-free [39] , which we feel is a more natural and advantageous realization of "optimistic" fair exchange in the multi-user setting; (1) If every fair exchange is performed normally (i.e., every user behaves honestly), it is desirable that users need not contact the arbitrator even for the registration purpose. ( 2) The arbitrator in setup-driven schemes should be semi-online to respond to registration requests, even when no dispute between users occurs. (3) If there are several arbitrators, the user in setup-free schemes can decide on a particular arbitrator in run-time.
After defining security notions, we address our attention to the basic theoretical question, namely whether or not a scheme satisfying the security notions exists, and, if so, what are the minimal computational complexity assumptions under which this existence can be proven. We answer this by providing a generic setup-free construction which relies on one-way functions in the random oracle model and trapdoor one-way permutations in the standard model. While the construction in the standard model is of theoretic interest, some specific instantiations in the random oracle model are efficient enough for practical use. Finally, we revisit two well-known techniques of optimistic fair exchange; the verifiably encrypted signature and the sequential two-party signature. Fortunately, our result shows that these paradigms remain valid in the multi-user setting if the underlying primitives satisfy some security properties. Furthermore, the construction based on the verifiably encrypted signature shows that trapdoor permutations imply optimistic fair exchange schemes that are standalone as well as setup-free; a fair exchange scheme is stand-alone if the full signature is the same as it were produced by an ordinary signature scheme only [39] .
Preliminaries

Notation
If k ∈ N, then 1 k denotes the string of k ones. If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length, while if X is a finite set then |X| denotes its size. If x and y are strings, then x y denotes the concatenation of x and y. A function f (n) is negligible if for all polynomials p(n), f (n) < 1/p(n) hold for all sufficiently large n. An efficient algorithm A(·) is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) Turing machine. If A(·) is an efficient algorithm and x is an input for A, then A(x) denotes the probability space that assigns to a string s the probability that A, on input x, outputs s. For a probability space P , x ← P denotes the algorithm that samples a random element according to P . For a finite set X, x ← X denotes the algorithm that samples an element uniformly at random from X. If p(·, ·, · · ·) is a boolean function, then Pr[p(
. .] denotes the probability that p(x 1 , x 2 , . . .) is true after executing the algorithms x 1 ← P 1 , x 2 ← P 2 , . . ..
NP-Relations and Σ-Protocols
An NP-relation R is a subset of {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * for which there is an efficient algorithm to decide whether (α, β) ∈ R or not in time polynomial in |α|. The NP-language L R associated with R is the set of α for which there exists β such that (α, β) ∈ R, i.e.,
A Σ-protocol [16] for an NP-relation R is an efficient 3-move two-party protocol between the prover and the verifier on a common input α ∈ L R . Besides α, a valid NP-witness β for α, meaning (α, β) ∈ R, is also given to the prover as a private input. The prover first sends a commitment message c to the receiver. After receiving the commitment message c, the verifier sends a challenge message e to the prover. Finally, the prover sends a response message s to the verifier who decides to output 1 (accept) or 0 (reject) based on the input α and the transcript π = {c, e, s}. The transcript π is valid if the verifier outputs 1 (accept). A Σ-protocol should satisfy three properties: correctness, special soundness, and special (honestverifier) zero-knowledge. Correctness property states that for all α ∈ L R and all valid witnesses β for α, if the prover and the verifier follow the protocol honestly, the verifier must output 1 (accept). Special soundness property states that there is an efficient extraction algorithm (called a knowledge extractor) that on input α ∈ L R and two valid transcripts π 1 , π 2 with the same commitment message c outputs β such that (α, β) ∈ R. Special zero-knowledge property states that there is an efficient simulation algorithm (called a simulator) that on input α ∈ L R and any challenge message e, outputs a valid transcript π ′ = {c ′ , e, s ′ }. Moreover, the distribution of (c ′ , s ′ ) is computationally indistinguishable from the corresponding distribution on (c, s) produced by the prover knowing a valid witness β for α and the verifier.
A function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is a one-way function, if there exists a polynomial time algorithm which computes f (x) correctly for all x and the following probability is negligible for all PPT algorithm
A one-way function f is called a trapdoor (one-way) permutation, if f is a permutation (that is, every f (x) has a unique pre-image x) and there exists a polynomial-length trapdoor td such that the inverse of f can efficiently be computed with td. For simplicity, we let f −1 be an inverse algorithm of f with the trapdoor td. It is known that any language in NP has a Σ-protocol if one-way functions exist.
Theorem 1 ( [18, 22] ) A Σ-protocol for any NP-relation can be constructed if one-way functions exist.
While the Σ-protocol for any NP-relation can be constructed in generic ways [18, 22] , there exist very efficient Σ-protocols for specific cases; for example, GQ protocol [25] and Schnorr protocol [36] .
A Σ-protocol can be transformed into a signature scheme by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [20] . To sign a message m, the legal signer produces a valid transcript π = {c, e, s} of the Σ-protocol, where e = H(c, m) and H(·) is a cryptographic hash function modeled as a random function. The signature scheme obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to the Σ-protocol is secure in the random oracle model [6, 31] . It is also known that the Fiat-Shamir heuristic provides a non-interactive proof of knowledge in the random oracle model (i.e., the witness can be extracted by rewinding the adversary).
If there are two Σ-protocols, i.e., Σ 1 for R 1 and Σ 2 for R 2 , we can construct another Σ-protocol Σ OR (called OR-proof) [16] which allows the prover to show that given two inputs x 1 , x 2 , he knows w such that either (x 1 , w) ∈ R 1 or (x 2 , w) ∈ R 2 without revealing which is the case (called the witness indistinguishability property [19] ). By applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to the OR-proof Σ OR , we obtain a signature scheme S OR (called the OR-signature) secure in the random oracle model such that a valid signature can be generated by the signer who knows a valid witness w corresponding to either of the two inputs x 1 , x 2 . It is known that the Fiat-Shamir heuristic does not affect the witness indistinguishability property of the Σ-protocol.
Signatures
Syntax. A signature scheme S consists of three efficient algorithms: S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy). The key generation algorithm Sig-Gen takes as input a security parameter 1 k and outputs a signing key sk and a verification key vk. The signing algorithm Sign takes as input a signing key sk and a message m from the associated message space M, and outputs a signature σ. The verification algorithm Vrfy takes as input a verification key vk, a message m, and a signature σ; it outputs 1 if the signature is valid and 0 otherwise. We require that Vrfy vk (m, Sign sk (m)) = 1, for any m ∈ M.
Security.
We consider existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks, denoted by UF-CMA [24] . The adversary A is given oracle access to the signing oracle O Sign , i.e., A is allowed to query the signing oracle O Sign to obtain valid signatures σ 1 , . . . , σ n of arbitrary message m 1 , . . . , m n adaptively chosen by A. Naturally, A is considered successful only if it forges a valid signature σ of a message m which has not been queried to O Sign : m ∈ {m 1 , . . . , m n }. Quantitatively, we define
where m should not be queried to the signing oracle O Sign . Let S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme. An adversary A is said to (t, q s , ε)-break S, if A runs in time at most t, makes at most q s signing queries to O Sign , and succeeds in forgery with probability at least ε. S is said to be (t, q s , ε)-secure, if no adversary can (t, q s , ε)-break it. Asymptotically, S is UF-CMA-secure if Adv 3 Optimistic Fair Exchange in a Single-user Setting
Definition
We review the single-user model of optimistic fair exchange [17] . 
Ambiguity property states that
• Any "resolved signature" Res(m, PSig(m, SK, APK), ASK, PK) is computationally indistinguishable from the "actual signature" Sig(m, SK, APK).
In a meaningful application, Charlie runs Res to produce a full signature σ from σ ′ only if Bob's obligation to Alice has been fulfilled. The definition does not deal with the application-specific question of how Bob proves to Charlie that he fulfilled his obligation to Alice. The definition assumes the authenticity of public keys.
The security of non-interactive optimistic fair exchange consists of ensuring three aspects: security against the signer, security against the verifier, and security against the arbitrator. In the following, we denote by O PSig an oracle simulating the partial signing procedure PSig, and by O Res an oracle simulating the resolution procedure Res.
Security against Alice. We require that any PPT adversary A succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment.
where Setup * denotes the run of Setup with dishonest Alice (run by A) and SK * is A's state after this run. In other words, Alice should not be able to produce partial signature σ ′ , which looks good to Bob but cannot be transformed into her full signature by honest Charlie.
Security against Bob. We require that any PPT adversary B succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment.
where Query(B, O Res ) is the set of valid queries of B has asked to the resolution oracle O Res (i.e., (m, σ ′ ) such that PVer(m, σ ′ , PK, APK) = 1). In other words, Bob should not be able to complete any partial signature σ ′ that he received from Alice into a complete signature σ, without explicitly asking Charlie to do so. Note that there is no need to provide B with access to the signing oracle O Sig , since it could be simulated by O PSig and O Res . Finally, we remark that we also want Bob to be unable to generate a valid partial signature σ ′ which was not produced by Alice (via a query to O PSig ). However, this guarantee will follow from a stronger security against Charlie, which is defined below. Indeed, we will ensure that even Charlie, who knows more than Bob (i.e., ASK), cannot succeed in this attack.
Security against Charlie.
We require that any PPT adversary C succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment.
where Setup * denotes the run of Setup with dishonest Charlie (run by C), ASK * is C's state after this run, and Query(C, O PSig ) is the set of queries of C asked to the partial signing oracle O PSig . In other words, Charlie should not be able to produce a valid signature on m without explicitly asking Alice to produce a partial signature on m (which Charlie can complete into a full signature by himself using ASK).
Single-user Security
Multi-user Security
We show that the single-user security of optimistic fair exchange does not imply the multi-user security by presenting a counter-example.
Scheme. Let f (·) be a trapdoor permutation and S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme.
• Setup. Charlie generates a trapdoor permutation (f, f −1 ) and publishes APK = f , while he keeps ASK = f −1 secret. Alice generates (sk, vk) ← Sig-Gen(1 k ) and publishes PK A = vk and keeps SK A = sk secret.
• Sig and Ver. • PSig and PVer. To generate a partial signature, Alice chooses a random number r A and computes
• Res. Given a partial signature (m, y A , δ A ), the arbitrator Charlie first verifies its validity by checking Vrfy vk (m y A , δ A ) ? = 1. If valid, he computes r A = f −1 (y A ) and returns σ A = (r A , δ A ).
The Single-user Security.
The above scheme is secure in the single-user setting, which can easily be shown following the proofs in [17] . For details, see appendix A.
Attack Scenario.
We observe that y A can be re-used by a dishonest user without knowing the corresponding r A , which causes the scheme to be insecure in the multi-user setting. Dishonest users Bob and Eve attack Alice as follows:
1. Alice gives a partial signature (m A , y A , δ A ) to Bob, where Therefore, the above optimistic fair exchange scheme is secure in the single-user setting but insecure in the multi-user setting. 4 This counterexample entails the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The single-use security of optimistic fair exchange does not imply the multi-user security.
Remark 1 (Disclaimer) Theorem 2 does not claim that all previous schemes (e.g., [2, 3, 11, 17] ) are insecure in the multi-user setting. Even though the previous schemes were proved secure in the single-user models (or in the incomplete models), we believe that they are also secure in the multi-user model of Section 4.
4 Optimistic Fair Exchange in a Multi-user Setting
Definition
Instead of defining the syntax and security from scratch, we extend the model of [17] to the multiuser setting. Firstly, we separate the Setup algorithm of the single-user setting into two algorithms Setup TTP and Setup User to model the setup-free optimistic fair exchange. By running Setup User , each user U i generates his own key pair (SK U i , PK U i ).
Definition 2 A non-interactive optimistic fair exchange involves the users (signers and verifiers) and the arbitrator, and is given by the following efficient algorithms:
• Setup TTP . The arbitrator setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter and returns a secret arbitration key ASK and a public partial verification key APK.
• Setup User . The user setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter and (optionally) APK.
It returns a private signing key SK and a public verification key PK.
• Sig and Ver. These are similar to conventional signing and verification algorithms of an ordinary digital signature scheme.
• PSig and PVer. on m (and a proof that U j fulfilled his obligation to U i ). In this case,
Correctness property states that
and
Ambiguity property states that
We do not deal with the subtle issue of timely termination addressed by [2, 3] . We remark, however, that the technique of [2, 3] can easily be added to our solutions to resolve this problem. The security of non-interactive optimistic fair exchange is composed of ensuring three aspects: security against signers, security against verifiers, and security against the arbitrator. To clarify the identity of the signer, we hereinafter assume that the message m (implicitly) includes the identity of the signer. One simple and trivial solution is to include the signer's identity inside the message. If the included signer's identity does not correspond to the subject of the alleged signer's public key, we consider the signature (or the partial signature) is invalid. We also remark that it is a good practice to include an enforcing resolution policy κ inside the message, as suggested in [3] .
In order to consider the collusion attack of dishonest users, we modify the resolution oracle O Res . In the single-user setting, the input to O Res is (m, σ ′ ), assuming that σ ′ is the partial signature value of the single signer Alice and the oracle checks the validity of σ ′ by using Alice's public key. In the multi-user setting, we define the input to O Res as (m, σ ′ , PK U i ) where PK U i is the public key of the alleged signer U i . As usual, we assume that the authenticity of public keys can be verified and each user should show his knowledge of the legitimate private key in the public key registration stage to defend against key substitution attacks.
For simplicity but without loss of generality, when we model either the dishonest verifier or the dishonest arbitrator, we suppose that the adversary attacks an honest user Alice and the adversary can collude with all other (dishonest) users. 5 Therefore, the dishonest verifier or the dishonest arbitrator has access to private keys of all users except Alice, and the partial signing oracle O PSig , taking as input a message m, always returns Alice's partial signature σ ′ A on m. Security against Signers.
We require that any PPT adversary A, who models the dishonest signer Alice, succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment.
In the single-user setting, the signer Alice wins if she comes up with a partial signature (m, σ ′ ) which is valid with respect to her public key but cannot be transformed into her full signature by the honest arbitrator. In the multi-user setting, Alice wins if she comes up with (m, σ ′ , PK A ) where σ ′ is a valid partial signature with respect to PK A but cannot be completed to the full signature (w.r.t. PK A ) by the honest arbitrator. Note that there is no need to provide A with access to any kind of the partial signing oracle, since she has access to private keys of all users and can simulate all partial signing oracles by herself.
Security against Verifiers.
We require that any PPT adversary B succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment.
where Query(B, O Res ) is the set of valid queries of B has asked to the resolution oracle O Res (i.e., (m, σ ′ , PK U i ) such that PVer(m, σ ′ , PK U i , APK) = 1). Even though the adversary B is not allowed to ask a valid query (m, · , PK A ) with the target message m, it can freely ask (·, · , PK U i ) to the resolution oracle O Res as long as PK U i is not Alice's public key. This very property was used to attack the scheme of Section 3.2. Note that there is no need to provide B with access to the signing oracle O Sig , since it can be simulated by O PSig and O Res .
Security against the Arbitrator. We require that any PPT adversary C succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment.
In identity-based cryptosystems, fixing the identity of the target user also fixes the corresponding public key and consequently weakens the security level (so-called "selective-ID security" [15, 8] ). However, fixing the identity of the target user in our context does not impose any constraint on the corresponding public key.
where Setup TTP * denotes the run of Setup TTP with the dishonest arbitrator (run by C), ASK * is C's state after this run, and Query(C, O PSig ) is the set of queries of C asked to the partial signing oracle O PSig .
Generic Construction
We present a generic construction of non-interactive setup-free 6 optimistic fair exchange based on the OR-proof where the signer has one witness and the arbitrator has the other witness. We use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic in the random oracle model and the non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge in the standard model.
Scheme. Let S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy) be an ordinary signature scheme.
• Setup TTP . The arbitrator chooses (sk, vk) by running Sig-Gen(1 k ) and sets (ASK, APK) = (sk, vk).
• Setup User . Each user U i chooses (sk i , vk i ) by running Sig-Gen(1 k ) and sets (SK U i , PK U i ) = (sk i , vk i ).
• Sig. When a user U i wants to sign a message m, the signer generates an ordinary signature s 1 on "0||m" (i.e., s 1 = Sign sk i (0||m)) and then generates an OR-signature s 2 on "1||m" for the knowledge of sk i or Sign sk (1||m). Since the signer U i knows sk i , he can generate the valid OR-signature s 2 . The signature value on m is σ U i = (s 1 , s 2 ).
• Ver. To verify the signature σ U i = (s 1 , s 2 ) on m, a verifier checks that (1) Vrfy vk i (0||m, s 1 ) ? = 1 and (2) s 2 is a valid OR-signature on "1||m" for the knowledge of sk i or Sign sk (1||m).
• PSig and PVer. The same as Sig and Ver except that the partial signature σ ′ U i on m is s 1 .
• Res. For the user U i 's partial signature σ ′ U i = s 1 on m, the arbitrator first checks that Vrfy vk i (0||m, s 1 ) ? = 1 and then computes an OR-signature s 2 on "1||m" for the knowledge of sk i or Sign sk (1||m). Since the arbitrator knows sk, he can compute an ordinary signature Sign sk (1||m) and then the valid OR-signature s 2 . The arbitrator outputs σ U i = (s 1 , s 2 ).
The correctness property of the scheme is obvious and the ambiguity property follows from the witness indistinguishability of the OR-signature s 2 . We now analyze the security.
Theorem 3 The generic construction of the optimistic fair exchange scheme is multi-user secure in the random oracle model if the underlying signature scheme is secure.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 4 If there are one-way functions, we can build the setup-free optimistic fair exchange schemes that are multi-user secure in the random oracle model.
Proof: Secure signatures exist if and only if one-way functions exist [28, 33] . Together with Theorem 3, we obtain Theorem 4 .
The proof of Theorem 3 only requires two properties from the Fiat-Shamir proofs: (1) witness indistinguishability and (2) proof of knowledge. Hence, we can use the straight-line extractable witness indistinguishable proof [30] instead of the Fiat-Shamir proof. Like the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, the construction of the straight-line extractable witness indistinguishable proof starts with the Σ-protocol but the length of the resulting proof is much longer. However, non-programmable random oracle is used and better exact security can be obtained.
Instead of the Fiat-Shamir proof, we can also use the non-interactive witness indistinguishable proofs of knowledge for sk i or Sign sk (m). In this case, we do not need the random oracle and can instead use a common reference string (which could be generated by the arbitrator). 7 The construction of non-interactive witness indistinguishable proofs of knowledge requires the existence of trapdoor permutations [35] and this observation leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 5 If there are trapdoor one-way permutations, we can build the setup-free optimistic fair exchange schemes that are multi-user secure in the standard model.
Remark 2 While the construction using non-interactive witness indistinguishable proofs of knowledge in the standard model is mainly of theoretic interest, the construction using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic in the random oracle is efficient for specific cases, as there are efficient Σ-protocols for the knowledge of a signature value and for the knowledge of a secret key corresponding to a given public key (e.g., [25, 36, 13, 14, 9]). For readers who are not familiar with all the theory, Appendix C provides a concrete (efficient) example of the generic construction in the random oracle model.
Previous Paradigms Revisited
Optimistic Fair Exchange from Verifiably Encrypted Signature
Suppose Alice wants to show Bob that she has signed a message, but does not want Bob to possess her signature. Alice first encrypts her signature using the public encryption key of the arbitrator, and sends the ciphertext to Bob with proof that she has given him a valid encryption of her signature. Bob can verify that Alice has signed the message, but cannot deduce any information on her signature. Later in the protocol, if Alice is unable or unwilling to reveal her signature, Bob can ask the arbitrator to decrypt the ciphertext of Alice's signature.
Scheme. Let (P, V ) be a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system for the NP-language L = {(c, m, ek, vk) | ∃s [c = Enc ek (s) ∧ Vrfy vk (m, s) = 1]}, where E = (Enc-Gen, Enc, Dec) is an encryption scheme and S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy) is a signature scheme. 8 • Setup TTP . The arbitrator chooses (dk, ek) by running Enc-Gen(1 k ) and sets (ASK, APK) = (dk, ek). 7 We use a common "reference" string rather than a common "random" string. The arbitrator can indeed publish the common reference string because in our particular scheme cheating in OR-signature or NIZK does not help the arbitrator.
8 For brevity's sake, we omit the description of a common reference string, which could be generated by the arbitrator.
• Sig. When a user U i wants to sign a message m, the signer generates a signature s = Sign sk i (m). The signature value of m is σ U i = s.
• Ver. To verify the signature σ U i = s of m, a verifier checks Vrfy vk i (m, s) ? = 1.
• PSig. When a user U i wants to generate a partial signature of m, the signer first computes a signature s = Sign sk i (m) and then encrypts s with APK, i.e., c = Enc ek (s). The partial signature of m is σ ′
, where π is a proof showing (c, m, ek, vk i ) ∈ L.
• PVer. To verify the partial signature σ ′ U i = (c, π) of m, a verifier checks that π is an accepting proof for the statement (c, m, ek, vk i ) ∈ L. If so, 1 is returned and otherwise, 0 is returned.
• Res. For the user U i 's partial signature σ ′ U i = (c, π) of m, the arbitrator first checks that π is an accepting proof for the statement (c, m, ek, vk i ) ∈ L and then decrypts s = Dec dk (c). The arbitrator outputs σ U i = s.
For security analysis, we need the concept of simulation-sound NIZK proofs [34] . The soundness property of ordinary proof systems states that with overwhelming probability, the prover should be incapable of convincing the verifier of a false statement. Intuitively, the simulation-sound property requires that this remains the case even after a polynomially bounded party has seen a simulated proof of its choosing. The formal definition of simulation soundness can be found in [34] .
Theorem 6
The optimistic fair exchange scheme based on a verifiably encrypted signature is secure if the underlying E is CCA-secure, S is UF-CMA-secure, and (P, V ) is a simulation-sound NIZK proof system.
Proof: See Appendix D.
We observe that the full signature σ U i = s is a signature value of the underlying ordinary signature scheme S, which means that the fair exchange scheme is stand-alone. 9 In addition, CCA-secure encryption E, UF-CMA-secure signature S, and simulation-sound NIZK proof system (P, V ) can be built from trapdoor permutations [34, 28, 33] . Hence, we obtain the following existence theorem of setup-free and stand-alone fair exchange schemes.
Theorem 7
If there are trapdoor one-way permutations, we can build the optimistic fair exchange schemes that are setup-free and stand-alone.
Optimistic Fair Exchange from Sequential Two-Party Multisignature
A multisignature scheme allows any subgroup of users to jointly sign a document such that a verifier is convinced that each user of the subgroup participated in signing. To construct an optimistic fair exchange, we can use a simple type of multisignature, which is called a sequential two-party multisignature.
A sequential two-party multisignature MS consists of five efficient algorithms: MS = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy, MSign, MVrfy). Key generation algorithm Sig-Gen, signing algorithm Sign, and verification algorithm Vrfy are similar to the conventional algorithms of an ordinary signature scheme. MSign takes as input (m, s i , vk i , sk j ) and returns a multisignature s ij , where m ∈ M is a message, sk j is a signing key, s i is a valid signature w.r.t. a verification key vk i , and s ij is a multisignature w.r.t. verification keys vk i and vk j . MVrfy takes (m, s ij , vk i , vk j ) as input and returns 1 (accept) or 0 (reject). Correctness property requires that Vrfy vk i (m, Sign sk i (m)) = 1 and MVrfy(m, MSign(m, s i , vk i , sk j ), vk i , vk j ) = 1, for any m ∈ M. A multisignature scheme is symmetric if s ij and s ji are computationally indistinguishable. 10 For security consideration, we allow the adversary A, who tries to forge a multisignature w.r. (m, s i ) = 1. While the adversary A is allowed to create arbitrary keys for corrupted users, we require A to prove knowledge of secret keys during the public key registration. For simplicity, we follow the model of [7] which asks A to output the public key and secret key of a corrupted user in the key registration stage. Let Query(A, O Sign ) and Query(A, O MSign ) be the set of valid queries of A to O Sign and O MSign , respectively. We define A's advantage of attacking MS as follows. 
Remark 3
If a sequential two-party signature scheme MS = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy, MSign, MVrfy) is UF-CMA-secure, the induced signature scheme S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy) is also UF-CMA-secure.
By relaxing the definition of optimistic fair exchange to allow interactive registration during setup (i.e., setup-driven), we can have much simpler (almost trivial) schemes based on the sequential twoparty multisignature. Each user U i generates four keys SK U i , PK U i , ASK U i , APK U i and sends PK U i , ASK U i , APK U i to the arbitrator, who checks if the keys were properly generated. The arbitrator will then store ASK U i and certify APK U i . A verifier will accept partial signatures from U i only if they are valid w.r.t. APK U i .
Scheme.
Let MS = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy, MSign, MVrfy) be a sequential two-party multisignature scheme.
• Setup TTP and Setup User . Each user U i chooses (sk 0
) by running Sig-Gen(1 k ) twice, and sends (vk 0
) to the arbitrator. After checking validity of the keys, the arbitrator stores sk 1 U i and certifies vk 1
. If we use a simplified notation such as sk i 0 = sk 0 • Sig. When a user U i wants to sign a message m, the signer computes s i 0 = Sign sk i 0 (m) and a multisignature s i 0 i 1 = MSign(m, s i 0 , vk i 0 , sk i 1 ). The signature value of m is σ U i = s i 0 i 1 .
• Ver. To verify the signature
• PSig. When a user U i wants to generate a partial signature of a message m, the signer computes a signature
• PVer. To verify the partial signature σ ′
If so, 1 is returned and otherwise, 0 is returned.
•
Remark 4 While the generic construction based on the sequential two-party multisignature is almost trivial, specific instantiations could be very efficient by directly using the combined signing key sk
to generate multisignatures and the combined verification key pk U i = pk 0
to verify multisignatures.
Theorem 8 The setup-driven optimistic fair exchange scheme based on a sequential two-party multisignature is secure if the underlying multisignature is UF-CMA-secure.
Proof: See Appendix E. 
Security against Bob.
To show security against Bob, we convert any attacker B that attacks the fair exchange scheme into an inverter Inv for the trapdoor one-way permutation f . Recall that Inv gets as input a trapdoor one-way permutation g : D → D and b ∈ D, and wins if Inv outputs a ∈ D satisfying b = g(a). On the other hand, B expects (PK, APK) and oracle access to both O PSig and O Res , and wins if B forges a signature σ of some message m without asking a valid query (m, σ ′ ) to O Res . Let (m B , σ B ) be the successful forgery of the attacker B. We can assume that B obtained the corresponding partial signature σ ′ B on m B from O PSig , since the underlying signature scheme S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy) is existentially unforgeable.
On input of g and b, Inv begins simulating the attack environment of B. It picks a random signing/verification key pair (sk, vk) by running Sig-Gen(1 k ), sets PK = vk, SK = sk, APK = g, and gives (PK, APK) to B. Let q PSig be the total number of O PSig queries made by B and j be a random number chosen by Inv in the interval of {1, 2, · · · , q PSig }. Now, Inv knowing SK = sk responds to the i-th O PSig query m i of B as follows.
• If i = j, Inv sets y i = b and computes
• If i = j, Inv picks r i ∈ D randomly and computes , Inv outputs a random number. Otherwise, Inv outputs r. Let ǫ be the success probability of B's forgery in the real attack environment. Since b ∈ D and r ∈ {1, · · · , q PSig } are randomly chosen and g is a permutation, Inv succeeds in inverting g with a probability ǫ ′ ≥ ǫ/q PSig .
Security against Charlie.
To show security against Charlie, we convert any arbitrator C that attacks the optimistic fair exchange scheme into a forger F for the underlying signature S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy). The forger F , on input vk, generates a trapdoor permutation (f, f −1 ) and gives (ASK, PK, APK) = (f −1 , vk, f ) to C. Now, F responds to the i-th O PSig query m i of C with σ ′ = (y, δ A ), where y is chosen randomly and δ = Sign(m i y) is obtained from its own signing oracle O Sign . When C outputs the forgery (m, σ A ) where σ A = (r A , δ A ), F computes y A = f (r A ) and outputs (m y A , δ A ). We see that the simulation is perfect and F succeeds in producing a new forgery if and only if C succeeds. Security against Verifiers.
Appendix B. Security Proof for Theorem 3
To show security against the verifier, we convert any verifier B that attacks the optimistic fair exchange scheme into a forger F for the underlying signature S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy). Recall that F gets vk as input and has access to the signing oracle O Sign . The forger F wins if it forges a signature which has not been queried to O Sign . On the other hand, B expects (PK A , APK) as input and has access to both O PSig and O Res oracles. B wins if it forges a signature σ of a message m without asking a valid query (m, σ ′ , PK A ) to O Res . Let (m, σ) be a successful forgery of B, where s 1 is a signature on "0||m" (w.r.t. PK A ) and σ = (s 1 , s 2 ). If B did not obtain the corresponding partial signature σ ′ = s 1 from O PSig , s 1 becomes an existential forgery of S and the analysis of this type of attack is covered in the security against the arbitrator discussed later. Hence, we assume that B has obtained the corresponding partial signature σ ′ = s 1 from O PSig .
On input vk, the forger F begins simulating the attack environment of B. It sets vk 1 = vk and picks a random key pair (sk 2 , vk 2 ) by running Sig-Gen(1 k ). F flips a coin and gets a random bit b. According to the random bit b, F performs one of the following two games.
• Game 0 (b = 0): The forger F gives (PK A , APK) = (vk 1 , vk 2 ) to B and answers the i-th O PSig query m i of B by getting an ordinary signature Sign sk 1 (0||m i ) from its own signing oracle O Sign . To simulate O Res to a resolution query (m i , σ ′ i , PK i ) = (m i , s i 1 , PK i ) of B, the forger F checks the validity of (m i , s i 1 ) w.r.t. PK i and then computes Sign sk 2 (1||m i ) with sk 2 . From the knowledge of the signature Sign sk 2 (1||m i ), F can generate a valid OR-signature s i 2 on the message 1||m i . F returns σ i = (s i 1 , s i 2 ) to B.
• Game 1 (b = 1): The forger F gives (PK A , APK) = (vk 2 , vk 1 ) to B and answers the i-th O PSig query m i of B by computing a signature Sign sk 2 (0||m i ) with sk 2 . To simulate O Res to a resolution query (m i , σ ′ i , PK i ) = (m i , s i 1 , PK i ) of B, the forger F checks the validity of (m i , s i 1 ) w.r.t. PK i and then obtains a signature Sign sk 1 (0||m i ) from its own signing oracle O Sign . Now, F generates a valid OR-signature s i 2 on the message 1||m i from the knowledge of Sign sk 1 (0||m i ), and returns
If the attacker B succeeds in attacking, i.e., forges a valid OR-signature s 2 on 1||m without asking the arbitrator, the forger F rewinds B and obtains one of the two witnesses SK A and Sign ASK (1||m). The forger wins if (1) he performs Game 0 and extracts the witness SK A (total break recovering the signing key), or (2) he performs Game 1 and extracts the witness Sign ASK (1||m) (existential forgery of a new message "1||m"). Note that B cannot distinguish between Game 0 and Game 1 because the simulation is perfect and OR-signatures are witness indistinguishable. Therefore, if B succeeds with a probability ǫ, the forger F succeeds with a probability ǫ/2.
Security against the Arbitrator.
To show security against the arbitrator, we convert any arbitrator C that attacks the optimistic fair exchange scheme into a forger F for the underlying signature S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy). Recall that F gets vk as an input and has access to the signing oracle O Sign . On the other hand, C expects (ASK, PK A , APK) as input and has access to O PSig . C wins if it generates a valid signature σ A of some message m without asking m to O PSig .
Thus, here is how F , on input vk, simulates the run of C. To choose (ASK, APK), F runs Sig-Gen(1 k ) and obtains (sk C , vk C ). Then, F gives (ASK, PK A , APK) = (sk C , vk, vk C ) to C. 12 Now, F responds to the i-th O PSig query m i of C by getting a signature on "0||m i " from its own signing oracle O Sign . When C outputs the forgery (m, σ A ) where σ A = (s 1 , s 2 ) and s 1 is an ordinary signature on "0||m" (w.r.t. vk), F outputs (0||m, s 1 ). We see that the simulation is perfect and F succeeds in producing a new forgery if and only if C succeeds.
Random Oracles.
Careful readers could find that we omitted to simulate random oracles. The random oracles are (1) implicitly used in the OR-signatures that are based on the Fiat-Shamir heuristic and (2) explicitly called if needed. The simulation of the random oracles can be done simply by answering randomly but consistently since we do not need to manipulate the answers of the random oracles. The only exception is the knowledge extraction by rewinding, which can be treated easily. s 1 = (c 0 , z 0 ) on "0 m" and an OR-signature s 2 = (c 1 , z 1 , c 2 , z 2 ) on "1 m" by using x i . Thescheme E = (Enc-Gen, Enc, Dec) which is CCA-secure. Recall that D gets ek as an input and has access to the decryption oracle O Dec . The distinguisher D wins if it distinguishes encryptions of two equal-length messages of its own choosing. On the other hand, B expects (PK A , APK) as input and has access to both O PSig and O Res oracles and wins if B forges a signature σ of some message m without asking a valid query (m, σ ′ , PK A ) to O Res . Let (m, σ) be a successful forgery of the adversary B. If B did not obtain the corresponding partial signature σ ′ from O PSig , σ becomes an existential forgery of S and the analysis of this type of attack is covered in the security against the arbitrator discussed later. Hence, we assume that B has obtained the corresponding partial signature σ ′ from O PSig .
Let q be the total number of O PSig queries made by B. On input ek, the distinguisher D begins simulating the attack environment of B by generating a random key pair (sk, vk) ← Sig-Gen(1 k ) and setting (PK A , APK) = (vk, ek). After choosing j randomly in the interval of {1, 2, · · · , q}, the distinguisher simulates O PSig 's response to the i-th query m i of B as follows.
• If i = j, D chooses a random messageṁ 0 , setsṁ 1 = m i , and computes (ṡ 0 ,ṡ 1 )=(Sign sk (ṁ 0 ), Sign sk (ṁ 1 )). D sends the two "messages" (ṡ 0 ,ṡ 1 ) to the CCA challenger. Letċ b be the challenge ciphertext returned by the CCA challenger, which equals to either Enc ek (ṡ 0 ) or Enc ek (ṡ 1 ). Finally, •
To simulate O Res 's response to B's resolution query (m i , σ ′ i , PK i ) where σ ′ i = (c i , π i ), the distinguisher D checks the validity of π i .
• If π i is valid and PK i = vk, D obtains the plaintext s i of c i from its own decryption oracle O Dec .
The distinguisher D returns σ i = s i , which is a signature of m i w.r.t. PK i by the soundness of NIZK.
• If π i is valid and PK i = vk, D checks whether m i = m j or not. If m i = m j , D aborts the simulation and outputs a random bit to the CCA challenger. Otherwise, D obtains the plaintext s i of c i from its own decryption oracle O Dec and returns σ i = s i to B.
• If π i is invalid, D returns a random value to B.
If the challenge ciphertextċ b is the encryption ofṡ 0 (i.e., b = 0), c j has no information on the signature of m j and B's chance of forging a valid signature of m j (w.r.t. vk) is negligible. If the challenge ciphertextċ b is the encryption ofṡ 1 (i.e., b = 1), c j is an encryption of a valid signature of m j and the distribution of B's view in the simulated environment is identical with that in the real attack environment. Even after seeing a simulated proof π j in case of b = 0, B cannot generate O Res queries containing an accepting proof of a false statement by the simulation-sound property of the proof system (P, V ). Let (m, σ) be the final output of B. If m = m j , D outputs a random bit to the CCA challenger. If m = m j and σ is a valid signature 13 of m with respect to vk, D outputs 1 and otherwise, D outputs a random bit to the CCA challenger. If B in the real attack environment succeeds with a non-negligible probability ǫ, the distinguisher D's advantage is also non-negligible and given as follows.
CCA-Adv
We convert an arbitrator C that attacks the optimistic fair exchange scheme into a forger F for the underlying signature S = (Sig-Gen, Sign, Vrfy). The forger F , on input vk, runs Enc-Gen(1 k ) and obtains (dk C , ek C ). Then, F gives (ASK, PK A , APK) = (dk C , vk, ek C ) to C. Now, 
Security against Verifiers.
We convert a verifier B attacking the optimistic fair exchange scheme into a forger F against MS. The forger F , given vk i , generates (sk j , vk j ) ← Sig-Gen(1 k ) and gives (PK A , APK A ) = (vk A 0 , vk A 1 ) = (vk j , vk i ) to B. We know that the induced signature scheme S is UF-CMA-secure and hence assume that B always makes a partial signature query m to forge a full signature of m. Security against the Arbitrator.
We convert an arbitrator C attacking the optimistic fair exchange scheme into a forger F against MS. The forger F , given vk i , generates (sk j , vk j ) ← Sig-Gen(1 k ) and gives (vk i 0 , sk i 1 , vk i 1 ) = (vk i , sk j , vk j ) to C. Now, F simulates O PSig simply by relaying queries and answers between C and its own signing oracle O Sign . The simulation is perfect and C's successful forgery (m, σ i ), where σ i = s i 0 i 1 = s ij , implies a forged multisignature (m, s ij , vk j ) for MS, which satisfies MVrfy(m, s ij , vk i , vk j ) = 1.
